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tion arose in Leuschner v. State, 41 Md. 
App. 423, 397 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 285 
Md. 731, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 933 (1979). 
In that case, an undercover State Police of-
ficer had been placed in the defendant's 
jail cell under false pretenses. Statements 
made by the accused were held admissible 
because they were not made in response to 
interrogation. The Hamilton court distin-
guished its situation from that in Leuschner. 
The court's decision in Hamilton is sure 
to delight law enforcement personnel. The 
use of "jail plants," which has long been a 
favored investigatory tactic, now has the 
court's official stamp of approval. This 
tactic, though, is not without its share of 
criticism. One court has stated that "[t]he 
frustration of the prosecuting authorities 
is understandable. There is, however, no 
excuse for this questionable conduct, which 
might result in reversal in a closer case." 
Flittie v. Solem, 751 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 
1985). But see Kamisar, Brewer v. Wil-
liams, Messiah, and Miranda; What Is ''In-
terrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 
Geo. L. J. 1, 69 (1978). 
- Edward B. Lattner 
Bailey v. State: PRE-TRIAL 
DISCLOSURE EXTENDED TO 
NON-MARYLAND POLICE 
OFFICER 
In Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 496 
A.2d 665 (1985) the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that oral statements which 
the state intended to use at trial and which 
had been made by the defendant to out-of-
state police were statements made by the 
defendant to a state agent within the mean-
ing of Md. Rule 4-263(b)(2) (formerly 
Rule 741(b)(2». 
The appellant, Bailey, was charged with 
having committed a robbery with a deadly 
weapon on September 29, 1983. Along 
with other property alleged to have been 
taken from the victim was a 1967 Ford 
Mustang. Bailey and a companion were ar-
rested later that day in possession of the 
Mustang on the New Jersey Turnpike by 
Officer Jenkins, of the New Jersey State 
Police. 
On February 16, 1984, the state said 
that Bailey had made no oral or written 
statements known to them at that time. 
The defendant then formally requested, 
pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(b), that the 
state submit a copy of the substance of 
each statement made by the defendant to a 
"state agent" that the state intended to use 
at trial. The state did not respond, leaving 
intact its position that no statement had 
been made. The state did, however, list 
Officer Jenkins as a witness it intended to 
call. 
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At trial, during the opening statement, 
the prosecution. made reference to and de-
scribed the prearrest statement made by 
the defendant to Officer Jenkins. The de-
fense objected based on the state's failure 
to disclose this statement prior to trial. 
The trial court ruled there was no discov-
ery violation because Officer Jenkins was 
not a "state agent" within the meaning of 
that phrase as used in Maryland Rule 
4-263. 
The court of appeals granted certiorari 
to decide whether the statements made by 
the defendant to non-Maryland police of-
ficers which the state intended to use at 
trial, were discoverable under Md. Rule 
4-263. 
In support of the trial court's ruling, the 
state made three arguments. First, the 
state argued that Md. Rule 4-263 is not ap-
plicable to agents of another sovereign. 
The court rejected this argument noting 
that the inter-relationship between sub-
sections (a) and (b) of the rule require a dif-
ferent interpretation than that posited by 
the state in this case. Md. Rule 4-263(a) 
requires certain disclosures to be made by 
the state without the defendant's request. 
Subsection (b) deals with those matters 
discoverable on request by the accused, in-
cluding those made to a "state agent." Md. 
Rule 4-263(b )(2). However, under the 'old 
rule', subsection (a) contained the follow-
ing scope provision, conspicuously absent 
from subsection (b): "the State's Attorney's 
obligations under this section extend to ma-
terial and information in the possession or 
control of . . . any others who have par-
ticipated in the investigation ... of the case 
and who ... with reference to the particu-
lar case have reported to his office." Rule 
741(a)(3) (emphasis added). If the state's 
contention was correct, the state would be 
forced to disclose the statement because 
subsection (a) would not be limited to "state 
agents." The defense however, would not 
be able to acquire the substance of the 
statement under subsection (b) because it 
would be limited to "state agent." In addi-
tion, most motions to suppress are based 
on federal constitutional violations in ob-
taining the evidence. These violations may 
be made by either state or federal agents. 
Clearly, the state's interpretation of Md. 
Rule 4-263 creates anomalous results and 
frustrates the very purpose of the rule. 
The prosecution's second contention 
was that the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 
(1982), has applicability to the discovery 
issue here on appeal. The Jencks Act cur-
rently requires production of statements 
"in possession of the United States." The 
state claimed that the statements here are 
in possession of state officials, which would 
not constitute "in the possession of the 
United States," for purposes of the act. 
According to the court, the Jencks Act ~ 
was inapplicable to the present situation 
because the scope provisions of 4-263 
clearly prove a contrary intent. The court, 
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again, made reference to the scope provi-
sion of Rule 74 1 (a)(3), noting that in reen-
actment the provision had been moved 
from subsection (a)(3) to subsection (g) and 
now reads "obligations of the State's At-
torney under this Rule." Md. Rule 4-263(g) 
(emphasis added). "This change merely 
presents more clearly the intent of the 
predecessor, Md. Rule 741(a) and does 
not represent an enlargement of the obli-
gations of a State's Attorney in furnishing 
disclosure." 303 Md. at 651, 496 A.2d 
at 668. 
Finally, the state argued that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in decid-
ing to admit Officer Jenkin's testimony 
and in permitting prosecutor's reference to 
it in his opening remarks. Alternatively, 
the state claimed that if there was error, it 
was not prejudicial. The court, once again, 
rejected this contention, drawing an anal-
ogy between this case and Colter v. State, 
297 Md. 423,466 A.2d 1286 (1983). Colter 
involved the portion of the discovery rule 
dealing with the identity of alibi witnesses 
and rebuttal-to-alibi witnesses. The court 
held that the practice of the judge exclud-
ing testimony from these nondisclosed 
witnesses was an abuse of discretion. In 
the instant case, however, the trial judge 
ruled there was no discovery violation, the 
question was never reached as to what 
sanction, if any, should be applied. The 
court went on to explain that there was a 
discovery violation in this case and whether 
24- The Law Forum/Winter, 1986 
or not it was prejudicial, turns on two 
things. The first is whether Bailey would 
have moved to suppress upon obtaining 
the statements; the second is whether that 
motion to suppress would have been suc-
cessful. 
Based on the above reasoning, the court 
remanded the case without affirmance or 
reversal, mandating that the trial court 
undertake a process potentially involving 
three steps. First, the trial judge will real-
ize that there was a discovery violation. He 
shall consider the defendant's objection as 
of the time it was made and then determine 
the appropriate remedy. If exclusion is the 
proper remedy, then a new trial will be 
granted. If exclusion is not necessary, then 
the judge proceeds to step two. 
Next, a suppression hearing should be 
held if the defendant moves to suppress on 
other grounds. At that hearing, a deter-
mination of whether to exclude or not must 
be made. Again, if exclusion is the appro-
priate remedy a new trial must be granted. 
Step three involves the determination of 
prejudice. If exclusion was not the appro-
priate remedy in the suppression hearing, 
the state must then prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that there was no prejudice or 
the judge shall grant a new trial. 
The court's holding in Bailey serves two 
purposes. First, it furthers the rationale 
behind Md. Rule 4-263; that of requiring 
the state to disclose statements, therefore 
apprising the defendant of the evidence 
against him, and forcing the defense to file 
motions to suppress prior to trial. Second, 
the ruling clearly lays out a three step anal-
ysis for the trial court to follow in evaluat-
ing possible discovery violations under the 
rule. 
- Lori S. Simpson 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.lmrex Company, 
Inc.: THE SUPREME COURT GIVES 
ITS APPROVAL TO THE USE OF 
THE CIVIL RICO PROVISIONS 
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, 
Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985), the Supreme 
Court examined the utilization of the pri-
vare civil action provisions of the Racke-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act ("RICO" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1970). The Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of the Second 
Circuit and may serve to greatly expand 
the use of the private civil action provi-
sions ofRICO. 
In 1979, Sedima, a Belgian corporation, 
entered into a joint venture agreement 
with Imrex to provide electronic com-
ponents to another Belgian corporation. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the 
buyer was to order the parts through Se-
dima, and then Imrex was to obtain the 
parts in this country and ship them to 
Europe. The net proceeds were to be split 
between Sedima and Imrex. However, Se-
dima became convinced that Imrex was 
presenting inflated bills, thereby cheating 
Sedima out of its fair share of the proceeds 
by collecting for nonexistent expenses. 
In 1982, Sedima filed suit in the Federal 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York against Imrex, setting forth 
several common law claims. In addition, 
Sedima filed claims under the civil action 
provisions of RICO, pursuant to § 1964(c). 
Two counts alleged violations of§ 1962(c), 
based on the predicate acts of mail and 
wire fraud. The third count alleged a con-
spiracy to violate § 1962(c). 
The district court dismissed the RICO 
counts for failure to state a claim. The 
court held the requirement of § 1964(c) 
that the jury be "by reason of a violation of 
section 1962", means that it must be dif-
ferent in kind from the direct injury result-
ing from the predicate acts of racketeering 
activity. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Com-
pany, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983). The court further held the com-
plaint must allege a "RICO-type injury", 
which was some type of distinct racketeer-
ing or competitive injury. Id. at 965. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision 
